

Martin Heidegger
Identity and Differenz (from GA 11)

Reworked translation, including translation of marginalia and supplements (with occasional notes in red),
by Will Britt¹

Foreword

The Principle of Identity contains the unaltered text of a lecture that was held on the 500-year anniversary of the University of Freiburg im Breisgau, for the faculty day on June 27, 1957. [Part of the Freiburg Lectures in GA 79]

The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics reproduces the partially revised discussion that concludes a seminar from winter semester 1956-57 on Hegel's "Science of Logic." The lecture took place on February 24, 1957, in Todtnauberg. [Part of the Hegel lectures in GA 86]

The Principle of Identity glances ahead and glances back: ahead into the realm from which what the lecture "The Thing" discusses was said; back into the realm of the essential lineage [*Wesensherkunft*] of metaphysics, the constitution of which is determined by differenz.

In the present publication, the belonging-together of *Identity and Differenz* is shown as what is to be thought.

To what extent differenz stems from the essence of identity, the reader should discover for him- or herself, by listening to the harmony that reigns between event and sustainment [*Austrag*].²

In this realm, nothing admits of proof [to argue, *argumentum*], but a great deal is pointed out.³

Todtnauberg, on September 9, 1957

The Principle of Identity⁴

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According to a customary formulation, the principle of identity reads: $A = A$. The principle holds as the highest law of thought. We shall try to reflect on this principle for a while. For we should like to experience through this principle what identity is.

When thinking is claimed by a matter and then pursues this, it can happen that it is transformed while underway [i.e., out of the steadily corresponding insight into the *matter* – / then a power of transformation pertains to the matter [*eignet der Sache*] – how so?]. It is therefore advisable, in what follows, to attend more to the path and less to the content. Duly to linger with the content would already block the progress of the lecture for us.

What does the formula $A = A$, in which one is obliged to present the principle of identity, say? The formula names the equivalence [i.e., identity] of A and A. To an equating there belong at least two. One A is equal to another. Does the principle of identity want to assert such a thing? Evidently not. The identical, Latin *idem*, is called in Greek *to auto*. Translated into our German language, *to auto* means "the same."

¹ [Translation revised from Joan Stambaugh's, by comparison with Andrew Mitchell's (in *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*). Translator's interpolations are always via square brackets; curly braces denote editor's insertions. I use 'identity' for *Identität*, 'equivalence' for *Gleichheit*, 'sameness' for *Selbigkeit*; 'differenz' for the Latinate *Differenz*, 'difference' for *Verschiedenheit*, 'divergence' for *Unter-Schied*, 'distinction' for *Unterschied*, 'distinguished' for *unterschieden*, and 'verbal distinction' for *Distinktion*.]

² [*Austragen* means 'carrying-out,' 'sustaining,' 'enduring,' or 'staging' (as in staging a competition). I translate it as 'sustaining' – hence *Austrag*: 'sustainment' – throughout. *Ereignis* will always be translated as 'event,' *Er-eignis* as 'event of appropriation.']

³ [Bolded vertical strokes indicate additions from Heidegger's marginalia that seemed easily worked into the text; other such marginalia are given as footnotes. Slashes (/) in marginalia indicate line breaks in the GA volume. Angle brackets indicate passages untranslated by Stambaugh.]

⁴ Cf. the series of lectures *Basic Principles of Thinking*, summer semester 1957 {GA 79, pp. 79-176}: tries to clarify the "historical" horizon for this lecture. / cf. *Appendix* {p. 83, below}

When one continually says the same – for example: “the plant is a plant” – one speaks in a tautology. For something to be able to be the same, one is always enough. Two are not required, as they are for equivalence.

The formula $A = A$ speaks of equivalence. It does not name A as the same. The customary formulation of the principle of identity thus conceals precisely what the principle is trying to say: A is A, i.e., every A is the same as itself.

While we are circumscribing the identical in this fashion, there echoes an old word by which Plato makes the identical perceptible, a word that points back to one still older. In the dialogue *The Sophist*, 254d, Plato speaks of *stasis* and *kinesis*, of standstill and change [*Umschlag*]. Plato has the stranger say at this place: *oukoun autōn hekaston toīn men duoīn heteron estin, auto d’ heautōi tauton*.

“Now it is indeed for you that each of the two is another, but itself
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the same as itself.”⁵ Plato says not only: *hekaston auto tauton*, “each itself the same,” but says *hekaston* [...] *heautōi tauton*, “each itself to itself the same.”

The dative *heautōi* means: each thing is itself given back to itself, each self is the same – namely, for it itself, with it itself. Our German language, like the Greek, offers the advantage of making clear the identical with the same word, but doing this in a juncture [*Fuge*] of its different forms.

Accordingly, the more fitting formulation of the principle of identity, A is A, says not only that every A is itself the same, but rather that every A is itself the same with itself. In sameness lies the relation of the “with,” hence, a mediation, a binding, a synthesis: the unification into a unity. Thus it comes about that, throughout the history of Western thinking, identity appears in the character of unity. But this unity is by no means the bland emptiness of that which, in itself relationless, persists in monotony. Nonetheless, to get to the point where the relationship of the same with itself comes to the fore – the relationship reigning in identity, echoing already from early on, decided and cast as this mediation – indeed, for even an accommodation⁶ to be found for this shining forth of mediation within identity, Western thinking required more than two thousand years. For only the philosophy of speculative idealism, prepared by Leibniz and Kant, established through Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel an accommodation |(the realm)| for the essence of identity as in itself synthetic. This cannot be shown here. Just one thing is to be retained: since the epoch of speculative idealism, it remains forbidden for thinking to represent the unity of identity as sheer monotony, and to disregard the mediation reigning in this unity.

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Where such representing and disregarding happen, identity is only abstractly represented.

Even in the improved formula “A is A,” only an abstract identity |what is abstractly identical| comes to the fore. Does it get that far? Does the principle of identity really assert anything about identity? No, at least not immediately. The principle far rather already presupposes what identity means and where it belongs.

How do we obtain any information about this presupposition? The principle of identity gives it to us, if we listen carefully to its basic tone, if we sensitively pursue [*nachsinnen*] that basic tone instead of just thoughtlessly |carelessly [*leicht-sinnig*]| mouthing the formula “A is A.” The principle really says [*eigentlich lautet*]: “A is A.” What do we hear? With this “is,” the principle tells us how every being is, namely: it itself the same with itself. |The transition is rushed| The principle of identity speaks of the being of beings. As a law of thought, the principle holds only insofar as it is a law of being, which reads: to every being as such there belongs identity, the unity with itself.

Heard in its basic tone |principal tone|, what the principle of identity asserts is exactly what the whole of Western European thought thinks, namely: the unity of identity⁷ forms a basic trait in the being of beings. |*on – hen / hen panta*| Everywhere, wherever and however we comport ourselves toward beings of every kind, we find ourselves claimed by identity. If this claim did not speak, then beings would never be capable

⁵ “Now it is the case for you that each of the two (others) is indeed an other, but itself the same as itself.” “Now it is the case for you that each is an other than the two, but itself the same as itself.” [Cf. Benardete: “Each of them is other than the two, and itself the same as itself.”]

⁶ wherefore “accommodation” – “locality” – listening to... (sheltering)

⁷ the “unity” that reigns in identity (the unifying one)

of appearing in their being. Consequently, there would also be no science. For were the sameness of its object not guaranteed in advance, science could not be what it is. [It could never come back to the same “object” and thereby remain in the steadiness of its progress.]

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By this guarantee, research secures for itself the possibility of its work. All the same, the guiding representation of the identity of the object never brings any conceivable use to the sciences. Consequently, what is successful and fruitful in scientific knowledge everywhere consists in something useless. The claim of the identity of the object *speaks*, whether the sciences hear this claim [properly as such] or not, whether they throw to the winds what has been heard or let themselves be strongly affected by it.

The claim of identity speaks from the being of beings. But now where the being of beings properly comes to language, in Western thinking at its earliest, namely in Parmenides, *to auto*, what is identical, speaks there in a sense that is almost overwhelming. One of Parmenides’ fragments reads:

*to gar auto noein estin te kai einai.*⁸

“The same, you see, is perceiving (thinking) as well as also being.”

Here what differ, thinking and being, are thought as the same. What does this say? Something entirely other in comparison to what we otherwise know as the doctrine of metaphysics, that identity belongs to being. Parmenides says: being belongs to an⁹ identity. What does identity mean here? What does the word *to auto*, the same, say in Parmenides’ fragment? Parmenides gives us no answer to this question. He places us before an enigma that we may not sidestep. We must acknowledge that in the earliest period/the springtime of thinking, long before thinking arrives at a principle of identity, identity itself speaks, namely, in a verdict which rules that thinking and being belong together in the same and from out of this same.

Unexpectedly, we have now already given a meaning to *to auto*, the same. We interpret sameness as belonging together. It is easy to represent this belonging together in the sense of identity as it is subsequently thought and generally familiar to us. What could

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prevent us? Nothing less than the principle itself that we read in Parmenides. For it says something else, namely: being belongs – along with thinking – in the same. Being is defined by an¹⁰ identity as a trait of this identity. Contrary to this, identity as it is subsequently thought in metaphysics is represented as a trait of being. Therefore, we cannot want to determine the former identity, which Parmenides names, starting from the latter, metaphysically represented identity.

The sameness of thinking and Being that speaks in Parmenides’ fragment comes from farther away¹¹ than the identity defined by metaphysics on the basis of, and as a trait of, being. [in what way?]

The guiding word in Parmenides’ fragment, *to auto*, the same, remains obscure. We shall leave it obscure. But we shall at the same time take a hint from the fragment at whose opening the word stands.

Meanwhile, however, we have already fixed the sameness of thinking and Being as the belonging together of the two. That was rash, maybe compelled. We must reverse that rashness. We can do so insofar as we do not consider the belonging together of which we have spoken as the ultimate or even the only authoritative interpretation of the sameness of thinking and Being.

If we think of belonging *together*¹² in the customary way, as the word’s emphasis already indicates, the sense of ‘belonging’ is determined by ‘together,’ i.e., by [the] unity [that plays in it]. In that case, ‘to belong’ means as much as: to be assigned to and placed into the ordering of a ‘together,’ arranged within the unity of something manifold, placed together into the unity of a system, mediated by the unifying middle of a standardizing synthesis. Philosophy represents this belonging together

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as *nexus* and *connexio*, as the necessary knotting of the one with the other.

⁸ the different translations, i.e., interpretations of this fragment

⁹ the

¹⁰ the

¹¹ pro-venance/lineage [*Her-kunft*]

¹² Cf. Leibniz; additionally, “On the Essence of Ground,” in *Pathmarks* (GA 9)

Belonging together, however, can also be thought of as *belonging* together. That wants to say: the together is now defined from the belonging. Of course, here it still remains to be asked what ‘belong’ then means, and how from it [the latter] the ‘together’ proper to it is first determined. The answer to these questions lies closer to us than we imagine, but it does not lie at hand. Enough for now, if by means of this reference we note the possibility of no longer representing belonging in terms of the unity of the together, but rather of experiencing this together from belonging. Yet does the reference to this possibility not exhaust itself in an empty play on words, fabricating something that lacks any purchase in a verifiable state of affairs?

So it looks, until we look more keenly and let the matter [or the thing: *die Sache*] speak.

The thought of a belonging together in the sense of *belonging* together arises from the perspective on a state of affairs already mentioned. It is, of course, on account of its simplicity that it is difficult to keep in view. Meanwhile, this state of affairs comes readily nearer to us, if we attend to the following: with the elucidation of belonging together as *belonging* together, we already had, according to Parmenides’ hint, thinking as well as also being, and thus what belongs to one another in the same.

If we understand thinking as the distinction of the human being, then we meditate on a *belonging* together that concerns the human and being. Immediately, we see ourselves gripped by questions: What does being mean? Who, or what, is the human being? Everybody easily sees that without a sufficient answer to these questions we lack the foundation upon which we can compose something reliable about the *belonging* together of the human and being.

As long as we question in this way, however, we remain confined within the attempt to represent the together of the human and being as a

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coordination [*Zuordnung*] and to arrange and explain this coordination starting either from the human or from being. With this attempt, the traditional concepts of the human and being form the footholds for the coordination of the two. [The human and being as two present-at-hand things, extant for themselves, which are supposed to be placed together after the fact and submitted to a coordination.]

How would it be if, instead of representing, undeterred, a mere coordination of the two in order to produce their unity, we were for once to attend to whether and how a belonging-to-one-another first of all is at stake [plays] in this ‘together’? There is even the possibility that we might glimpse the belonging together of the human and being, though only from afar, already in the traditional determinations of their essence. In what way?

The human is obviously some being. As such, the human belongs in the whole of being,¹³ just like the stone, the tree, or the eagle. ‘To belong’ here still means: ordered within being.¹⁴ But what is distinctive for humans consists in that they, as the beings who think, are open to being, are [brought before and at times] placed before being, remain referred to being and thus correspond to it [by corresponding to it – i.e., to beings – in being-human]. The human *is* properly this relationship of corresponding and is only this. [In which manner of being? Presencing to... and amidst... and with...] ‘Only’ – this means not a limitation but an excess. A belonging to being reigns within the human, a belonging which listens to being because¹⁵ it is *consigned* to being [(i.e., assimilated [*vereignet*] into the event)]. And being? Let us think being according to its inceptive meaning as presencing.¹⁶ Being presences to the human neither incidentally nor as an exception. Being essences and endures only in that by its claim it approaches [*an-geht*] the human.

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For the human, open for being, first lets being arrive as presencing. Such presencing needs [requires and demands] the openness of a clearing and thus remains, by this need, *consigned*¹⁷ to the human essence. This

¹³ “being”

¹⁴ beings!

¹⁵ insofar as it is exposed to [being] and at the same time is compelled by it.

¹⁶ SZ 25-6/GA 2:34-5.

¹⁷ *not yet* to speak of ‘owning’ [*eignen*] – too hasty. delivered-over [*überantwortet*], as it were.

does not at all mean that being is first and only posited by the human. [hence being [is] neither thesis (positing) nor synthesis] On the contrary, it becomes clear:

The human and being are consigned to one another. They belong to each other. From this belonging to each other [event], which [at least until now] has not been thought out more closely, above all the human and being have received those essential determinations by which the human and being are conceived metaphysically in philosophy.

We stubbornly misrecognize this prevailing *belonging* together of the human and being as long as we represent everything only in classifications and mediations, be it with or without dialectic. Then we always find only knots that are tied [organized] either from being or from the human, and that exhibit the belonging together of the human and being as interweaving. [As long as we represent the state of affairs in this manner, ‘the human’ and ‘being’ remain, so to speak, two different ‘beings’ that are supposed to be coupled (copula) to and with one another (cf. “On the Being-Question,” Jünger-Festschrift 1955) {GA 9, 385-426}.]

We do not as yet make an entrance¹⁸ into the *belonging* together. But how
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does it come to such an entrance? By setting ourselves apart from the bearing [*Haltung*] of representational thinking. This setting oneself apart is a leap [*Satz*] in the sense of a spring. It leaps away, namely, away from the habitual idea of man as the rational animal, which in modern times has become a subject for its objects. The departing leap [*Absprung*] at the same time leaps away from being. Yet being has been interpreted, since the early period of Western thought, as the ground in which every being as a being is grounded. [”ground” and “presencing”]

Where does the departing leap leap to, if it leaps away from the ground? Does it leap into an abyss? Yes, as long as we merely represent the leap, and [do so] in the purview of metaphysical thinking. No, insofar as we leap and let ourselves go.¹⁹ Where to? To where we are already admitted: into belonging to being. Being itself, however, belongs to us; for only with us can it essence as being, i.e., can it essence-toward/presence [*An-wesen*]. [being does not presence – but “is” presencing [*An-wesen*]]

Thus, in order to experience properly the *belonging* together of the human and being, a leap is necessary. This leap is the suddenness of the unbridged entrance [*Einkehr*]²⁰ into that belonging which has to allocate for the first time a reciprocity [*Zueinander*] of the human and being, and thus the constellation of the two. The leap is the sudden entry [*Einfahrt*] into the realm from which the human and being have each time already reached each other in their essence, because both are consigned to each other,
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[handed over,] out of extension as a gift [or out of an adequation: *aus einer Zureichung*]. The entry²¹ into the realm of this consignment first tunes and determines the experience of thinking.

Delivering-over of being to the human }
Responsibility of the human for being } → what determinatively attunes [*be-stimmt*] both nevertheless forbids a mere placing-adjacent just as much as a mixing (here something wholly other is to be thought: relatedness and relationship
[or: getting pulled and holding oneself toward: *Be-Zug und Ver-Hältnis*])

¹⁸ Entrance [*Einkehr*] – speaks as if we were somewhere outside – that fits in a certain way for metaphysical representing – cf. Hegel – the human and the absolute (*Holzwege*, GA 5); instead, ‘entrance’ (even this still in the horizon of metaphysical representing): *Wake up!* from oblivion// Waking away [*Entwachen*] into –

¹⁹ *Letting-go* / releasing oneself from sleep / sleepiness requires no leap – awakening out of the inceptive oblivion of the event (withdrawal). / Therefore, neither *leap* nor entrance / to become at-home (to dwell), into which we are already admitted. / Thus no ‘entrance’ needed: as if we stood outside. But also *no* ‘departing leap’

²⁰ Awakening in
neither entrance nor departing leap – rather, *recollective thinking*
Awakening into the sojourn in withholding
“Awake”

²¹ First stirring [*Entwachen*] into the event / roused / (ap-proprated into the event)

Strange leap [thus, no leap], which presumably yields us the insight that we do not yet reside sufficiently, where authentically we already are. Where are we? [A question without adequate [*zureichenden*] transition.] In what constellation of being and the human?²²

Today it at least seems that we no longer need complicated references, as we did years ago,²³ to catch sight of the constellation from out of which the human and being approach one another. One would like to think that it suffices to name the “atomic age” in order to let us experience how being presences for us today in the technological world. [inadequately [*unzureichend*] said] But may we then, without further ado, posit the technological world as at one with being? Manifestly not, not even if we represent this world as the whole in which atomic energy [“as ultimate reality”], calculating human planning [*cybernetics!*], and automation have been conjoined. With a reference to the technological world, why does this reference, constituted thus, even if it were an ever so wide-ranging description, in no way bring into view the constellation of being and the human? Because every analysis of the situation thinks short of the mark, insofar as the above-mentioned whole of the technological world is interpreted in advance [merely] on the basis of the human, as of human making. What is technological, represented in the broadest sense and according to its manifold appearances, is regarded as the plan that the human

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projects, the plan which finally drives the human to deciding whether he wants to become the servant of his plan or to remain its master.

By this representation of the whole of the technological world, one winds everything back upon the human and, at best, arrives at the demand for an ethics of the technological world. Caught up in this representation, one is of the opinion that technology would be merely the affair [*Sache*] of humans. One does not hear the claim of being that speaks in the *essence* of technology.

For ourselves, let us at long last set aside conceiving the technological merely technologically, i.e., starting from the human and its machines. Let us attend to the claim under which stand, in our age, not only the human but all beings, nature and history, with regard to their being.

What claim do we mean? Our whole Dasein finds itself everywhere challenged – now playfully and now urgently, now breathlessly and now ponderously – to devote itself to the planning and calculating [to the steering] of everything. What speaks in this challenge? Does it stem merely from a self-made human whim? Or do beings themselves already approach/concern us, and even in such a way that they address/claim us in their aptness to be planned and calculated? Then would [even] being stand thus under²⁴ the challenge to let beings appear in the purview of calculability?²⁵ [being [is] under the challenge as orderability toward essence – i.e., dispensed [*geschickt*] from out of positionality] Indeed. And not only this. In the same measure

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to which being is challenged, the human being is challenged, i.e., positioned, to secure the beings that approach it as the reserve for its planning and calculating and to drive this ordering into unavoidability. [Planning and strategy of peace – cybernetics]

²² instead of “constellation”: ordering-toward/coordination [*Zu-Ordnung*]

|
disposition

to bring into what belongs.

²³ Cf. Bremen Lectures, 1949, “Insight Into That Which Is” {GA 79} and “The Question Concerning Technology,” 1953 {GA 7}

²⁴ in the *dispensation*

how to say this more fittingly – constancy of the standing reserve – objectivity of the object [Germanic] – *objectivity* [Latinate] – actuality – up to presencing

“being” *dispensed* / *appropriated* in the event | *A-letheia*

²⁵ *Letting presence*

inadequately said: / letting presence itself transferred (whence and how), to let – to give into the free region – presence – as constant orderability.

The name for the gathering of the challenges that the human and being deliver to one another in such a way that they reciprocally position each other |– each in its way –| is “positionality” [*das Ge-Stell*]. <Some have been startled at this use of the word. But instead of “to position” [*stellen*], we say “to posit” [*setzen*]²⁶ and find nothing amiss in using the word ‘law’ [*Ge-setz*]. Hence, why not also positionality, if a glance into the state of affairs²⁷ demands this?>

That in which and from which the human and being approach one other in the technological world stakes its claim²⁸ in the manner of positionality. In the reciprocal meeting²⁹ of the human and being³⁰ we hear the claim that determines the constellation of our age. Positionality approaches/concerns us everywhere, immediately. Positionality is, if we may still speak in this manner, more in being³¹ than all of atomic energy and all machinery, more in being than the driving power of organization, communications, and automation. Because we no longer encounter that which is called positionality within the purview of representation, which lets us think the being of beings as presencing |in its dispensational variations up to objectivity| [45]

– positionality no longer approaches/concerns us as something present – for that reason, positionality is strange at first. It remains strange above all insofar as it is not something final, but itself first passes to us that which authentically³² reigns throughout the constellation of being and the human.

The *belonging* together of the human and being in the manner of reciprocal challenging brings startlingly nearer to us both that and how the human is assimilated [*vereignet*] to being, but being is dedicated [*zugeeignet*] to the human essence. In positionality reigns a rare assimilating and dedicating [or: bringing into ownership and delivering into ownership]. It is worth simply experiencing³³ this owning [*Eignen*] in which the human and being are delivered over [*ge-eignet*] to each other, i.e., making an entrance |waking|³⁴ into what³⁵ we name *the event of appropriation* [*Ereignis*]. The word ‘event’ is taken from ordinary language. To appropriate originally means: to eye up [*er-äugen*], i.e., to catch sight of, to call into view |*event* and *glimpse*|, to adopt [*an-eignen*] |into the clearing|. The word ‘event,’ thought from the appointed matter [*Sache*], is now supposed to speak as a guiding word in the service of thinking. As a guide word thought in such a way, it admits of translation just as little as the Greek guiding word *logos* or the Chinese *Tao*. The word ‘event’ here no longer means what we would otherwise name some happening [*Geschehnis*], an occurrence|, an incident|. The word is now used as a *singulare tantum*. What it names takes place³⁶ only in the singular [*Einzahl*] – no, no longer in a number, but uniquely |the sole|. What we experience in positionality as the constellating of [46]

²⁶ Being as positing [*Position*]

²⁷ “rockiness [*das Gefels*]” in Bettina von Arnim

{See “Bettine von Arnim, Goethe’s Correspondence with a Child,” in *Werke und Briefe in vier Bänden*, hrsg. von Walter Schmitz und Sibylle von Steinsdorff, Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, Bd. 2: 544} [cf. *Grimmsches Wörterbuch*, s.v. “Gefelse”].

²⁸ *as* this, it precisely *does not* stake its claim [or make its address: *spricht nicht an*]

only the thinking in the event that (already awakened out of oblivion) articulately resigns [*ent-sagende*] stakes its claim

announces itself [*zeigt sich an*] – of course, no to-question {?} acknowledged [= no questioning acknowledged?] and still less considered [*bedacht*] or even thought [*gedacht*]

²⁹ [*Sichstellen* – cf. *sich eine Herausforderung stellen*, to meet a challenge]

³⁰ here still what’s unmeasured, that “being” appears as the counterpart [*Gegenüber*] to the human, while as positionality it determines both – what essences in being and the human, along with the “and.”

³¹ “more in being”

³² “*authentically*” / this word now rigorously thought from out of the event.

³³ *thus no leap* / to undergo experience [*er-fahren*] – to become at-home in that into which we are already admitted

³⁴ Entrance only from *turning away* [*Verwendung*] into expropriation – turning to use [*Verwendung*] only out of usage.

³⁵ more precisely: making an entrance (into the) event / into It

³⁶ in what sense? Expropriation [*Enteignis*] toward the riddle of relational holding-away [*Ver-Hältnis*].

being and the human by the modern technological world is a *prelude* to what is called the event. Nevertheless, this event does not necessarily persist in its prelude. For in the event speaks the possibility that it [i.e., the event] converts [*verwindet*] the sheer reign of positionality into a more inceptive appropriating. Such a conversion of positionality from and into the event of appropriation would bring the appropriative – hence never accomplishable by the human alone – retraction of the technological world from its position of mastery into one of servitude³⁷ within the realm by which the human more authentically reaches into the event of appropriation.

To where has the way led? Toward the entrance of our thinking into what is simple, which we name the event of appropriation in a rigorous sense. It seems as if we now fell prey to the danger of all too casually directing our thinking toward a far-off universal, while, in fact, under what the word ‘event of appropriation’ would like to name, only what is nearest of that nearness in which we already reside immediately addresses [*zuspricht*] us. For what could be nearer to us than what brings us near to what we belong to, in which we are the ones who belong: the event of appropriation?

The event of appropriation is the realm,³⁸ oscillating³⁹ within itself, through which the human and being reach each other in their essence,⁴⁰ achieve their essencing, by losing those determinations which metaphysics has loaned to them. [already in each case – but not yet unconcealed – they have reached each other – remain held out to one other]

To think the event as the event of appropriation means to work at building the structure of this realm that oscillates in itself. Thinking receives the tools for building this

[47] self-suspending structure from language.⁴¹ For language is the most delicate but [and therefore] also the most vulnerable oscillation that relates [*verhaltende*]⁴² everything in the suspending structure of the event. We dwell in the event insofar as our essence is assimilated into language.

We have now attained a place along the way where the crude but inevitable question arises: what does the event have to do with identity? Answer: nothing. Identity, on the other hand, has much, if not everything, to do with the event of appropriation. How so? We shall answer by retracing in a few steps the way we took.

The event assimilates the human and being [“being”] into their essential⁴³ togetherness. We catch sight of a first, compelling flash⁴⁴ of the event in positionality. The latter constitutes the essence of the modern technological world. In positionality, we catch sight of a [distinctive] *belonging* together of the human and being in which the letting-belong⁴⁵ first determines the type of togetherness and its unity. We let ourselves be given guidance into the question of a belonging together, in which the belonging has precedence over the together, by Parmenides’ fragment: “The same, you see, is thinking as well as also being.” The question concerning the

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³⁷ not opposed to the human but in relatedness [*Bezug*] to the event
the *positive* experience of the “idea” and of nature

³⁸ *no ontic example for that* / just as already “being” uniquely [is] – in the *There is*

³⁹ to oscillate and to suspend [*schwingen und schweben*] – still inappropriate

⁴⁰ *the human* as the mortal – needed in the event

being as sustainment –: clearing of self-concealing – (essence of truth) / event

⁴¹ the saga of ownership [*die Sage des Eigentums*] – cf. *Unterwegs zur Sprache* {GA 12}

⁴² by keeping to itself [*an sich haltend*]; by supporting [*unter-haltend*]; by enduring [*aushaltend*]

⁴³ proprietary

⁴⁴ Cf. *Insight*, 1949 {GA 79} / the distant gleaming in the once-long-ago of *A-lētheia*

Cf. “Hegel and the Greeks,” *Gadamer Festschrift* {GA 9}

⁴⁵ Ap-propriating as letting belong

the latter from out of the fitting sanction [*Be-fugnis*]

| therein, the usage (of mortals)

but here the fourfold is purposely veiled

Letting as owning – granting – reaching – holding (*keeping* [Hältnis])

sense of this same is the question concerning the essence of identity. [transformation of “essence” in ownership (event)] The doctrine of metaphysics represents [in the double sense of modeling and mentally grasping] identity as a basic trait of being. Now it is shown that being belongs [together] with thinking in an⁴⁶ identity whose essence stems from that letting-belong-together which we name ‘the event.’ The essence⁴⁷ of identity is a⁴⁸ proper domain [*Eigentum*] of the event of appropriation [stems from the ownership of the event].

If there could be something tenable [*Haltbares*] in the attempt to point our thinking into the place⁴⁹ of identity’s essential lineage, then what would become of the title of the lecture? The sense of the title “The Principle of Identity” would have changed.

The principle at first presents itself in the form of a basic principle which presupposes identity as a trait of being, i.e., of the ground of beings. Along the way, this principle in the sense of an assertion has become a principle in the manner of a leap that sets itself apart from being as the ground of beings and thus leaps into the abyss. [Metaphysics!] Yet this abyss is neither empty nothingness nor a murky confusion, but the event of appropriation. In the event oscillates the essence⁵⁰ of what speaks as language, which was once named the house of being. “Principle of identity” now says: a leap required by identity’s essence because it needs that leap if the *belonging* together of the human and being is otherwise supposed to attain the essential light of the event.

On the way from principle as an assertion concerning identity to principle as a leap into identity’s essential lineage, thinking has transformed itself. Therefore, looking toward the present [*der Gegenwart entgegen*], beyond the human situation, thinking catches sight of the constellation [49]

of being and the human from out of what suits [*eignet*] the two to each other – from out of the event of appropriation.

Assuming that the possibility waits for us [*warte uns entgegen*] – the possibility that positionality, i.e., the reciprocal challenging-forth of the human and being into the calculation of the calculable, addresses us as the event that expropriates [*enteignet*] the human and being into what is authentically theirs – then a way would be open on which the human being more inceptively experiences beings, the whole of the modern technological world, nature and history, and above all their being [“being”].

As long as meditation on the world of the atomic age, in all the seriousness of responsibility, presses merely to pursue the peaceful use of atomic energy, but also contents itself only with that as the goal, thinking remains standing at the halfway point. By such halfway measures is the technological world secured⁵¹ all the more in its metaphysical predominance, and first rightly so.

But where has it been decided that, forever in the future, nature as such must remain the nature of modern physics, that history must exhibit itself only as the object of historiography? Indeed, we can neither reject [*verwerfen*] the contemporary technological world as the devil’s work, nor may we annihilate it, assuming it does not take care of this itself.

Still less, however, may we cling to the opinion that the technological world is of a kind that completely prohibits a departing leap out of it. This opinion is obsessed by the latest news [*das Aktuelle*] and believes that to be the only real thing. This opinion is indeed fantastical; on the other hand, not fantastical is a thinking ahead that looks toward [something else, namely,] what comes futurally [*zukommt*] upon us as the address [*Zuspruch*] from the essence of the identity of the human and being.

Thinking needed more than two thousand years properly to conceive such a simple relation [*Beziehung*] as that of the mediation [Hegel] within

⁴⁶ the

⁴⁷ what is *proprietary* [*Eigentümliche*]

⁴⁸ not clear enough

⁴⁹ topo-logy

⁵⁰ “essence”

⁵¹ the securing is, in its turn, “insured” – i.e., forgottenness of the event remains
Positionality is not experienced as event. What demands [*ver-langt*] this?

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identity. Are *we* then permitted the opinion that the thinking entrance into identity's essential lineage lets itself be worked out in one day? Precisely because this entrance demands a leap [the preparation of an awakening], it needs its time, the time of thinking. This is a time other than that of calculation, which today drags our thinking all over the place. Today, the computer calculates thousands of relations [*Beziehungen*] in one second. Despite their technical uses, these relations are without essence [*wesenlos*].

Whatever and however we attempt to think, we think within the playing field of tradition. Tradition reigns whenever, from out of retrospective thinking [*Nachdenken*], it frees us for a thinking ahead that is no longer planning [but is also not prophesying].

Only when we, in thinking, turn/devote ourselves [*zuwenden*] [in the step back] to what has already been thought will we be turned to use [*verwendet*] for what is still [*for the first time*] to be thought.

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This seminar made an attempt to start a conversation with *Hegel*. Conversation with a thinker can deal only with the matter for thinking. <“Matter [*Sache*]” means, according to the given definition, the point in dispute [*Streitfall*], what is questionable or contested [*Strittige*], which, uniquely for thinking, is *the* point that concerns thinking. But thinking does not at all first pick the fight [*Streit*], so to speak, over this contested issue. The matter for thinking is what in a dispute [*Streit*] is inherently contested. Our word ‘dispute’ [*Streit*] (Old High German *strit*) chiefly means not discord but strait [or pressing-upon: *Bedrängnis*].>⁵³ The matter for thinking presses upon/straitens thinking in such a way that it first brings thinking to its matter and from there brings thinking to thinking itself |but this thinking itself belongs to the matter|.

For Hegel, the matter for thinking is: thinking as such. In order not to misinterpret this delimitation of the matter – thinking as such – in psychological or epistemological terms, we must add by way of elucidation: thinking as such – in the developed fullness of the thoughtness of what is thought [*Gedachtheit des Gedachten*]. [or, overinterpretedly: the having-been-thought, now-being-thought of what has been thought; cp. Aristotle’s *to ti ēn einai*] What this means here we can understand only from Kant, from the essence of the transcendental, which Hegel, however, thinks absolutely, and that for him means speculatively. This is Hegel’s aim when he says of the thinking of thinking as such that it is developed “purely in the element of thinking” (*Encyclopedia*, Introduction, §14). To give it a short title, which yet is very difficult to think through rigorously [*sachgerecht*], this means: the matter for thinking is for Hegel “the thought [*der Gedanke*].” But this latter, unfolded to its highest essential freedom, is “the absolute idea [*Idee*].” Near the end of the *Science of Logic* (Lasson edition, Vol. II, 484), Hegel says of the absolute idea: “the absolute idea alone is⁵⁴ *being*, imperishable *life*, *self-knowing truth*, and it is *all truth*” (SL 735). Thus Hegel himself explicitly gives to the matter of his thinking that name which is inscribed over the whole matter of Western thinking, the name *being*.

(The manifold yet unified use of the word “being” was discussed in our seminar. For Hegel, being means

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first, but *never exclusively*, “indeterminate immediacy.” Being is |already| seen here from out of determining mediation, i.e., from the absolute concept, and thus with reference to the absolute concept.⁵⁵ “The truth of being is essence,” i.e., absolute reflection. The truth of essence is the concept in the sense of in-finite self-knowing. Being is the absolute thinking-itself of thinking. Absolute thinking alone is the truth of being, “is” being. Truth here means in general: that |the totality| of the knowable as such is known with a knowledge absolutely certain of itself.)


At the same time, Hegel rigorously [*sachgemäß*] thinks the matter of his thinking in [the context of] a conversation with the previous history of thought. Hegel is the first thinker who can and must think in this way. |Why? What requirement? Cp. *Differenzschrift*| Hegel’s relation to the history of philosophy is the

⁵² p. 58: “We risk an attempt with the step back.”

p. 60, near the bottom: persistence and *preparation* – | which “must be risked”

(These determinations are no announcement of a personal modesty – rather, they belong to the emergency that is determined by the matter of this thinking – (attitude of modesty!))

p. 60ff: in the face of that which *now* is (positionality)



⁵³ [Angle brackets indicate a portion of the text that is not marginalia but was not included in Stambaugh’s translation.]

⁵⁴ “is” speculative-dialectically [henceforth designated this way: “is”]

⁵⁵ “being”: the name for the dispensational levels of immediacy of

einai

re-presenting (*noein*)

speculative, and only as such a historical, relation. The character of the movement of history is a happening in the sense of the dialectical process. Hegel writes: “The same development of thinking that is presented in the history of philosophy is presented in philosophy itself, but freed from that historical outwardness, *purely in the element of thinking*” (*Encyclopedia*, §14).

We stop, baffled. According to Hegel’s own words, philosophy itself and the history of philosophy are supposed to be related to each other outwardly. But the outwardness of which Hegel thinks is by no means outward in the crude sense of being something merely superficial and indifferent. Outwardness here means that outside [*Außerhalb*] in which all history and every real course of events have their place in comparison to the movement of the absolute idea. The outwardness of history as explained here, in relation to the idea, emerges as the result of the idea’s self-externalization.

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Outwardness is itself a dialectical determination. We thus fall far short of Hegel’s authentic thought if we hold that Hegel has brought historical representation and systematic thinking into a unity in philosophy. For Hegel is concerned neither with historiography, nor with the system in the sense of a doctrinal structure.

What is the purpose of these remarks about philosophy and its relation to history? They would like to suggest that, for Hegel, the matter for thinking is inherently historical – but historical in the sense of happening. The process-character of thinking is determined by being’s dialectic. For Hegel, the matter for thinking is being, as the thinking that thinks itself, which thinking comes to itself only in the process of its speculative development, thereby running through stages of the shapes that are developed differently in each case, hence of necessity previously undeveloped.

Only from the matter for thinking thus experienced does a peculiar maxim arise for Hegel, the criterion for the manner in which he speaks with those thinkers that preceded him.

Therefore, when we attempt a thinking conversation with Hegel, we must speak with him not just about the same matter, but about the same matter in the same way. But the same is not the identical. In the identical, the difference [*Verschiedenheit*] disappears. In the same there appears [the belonging-together of what is different,] difference. This appears all the more pressingly [*bedrängender*] the more decisively thinking is approached by the same matter in the same way. Hegel thinks of the being of beings speculative-historically. But inasmuch as Hegel’s thinking belongs to an epoch of history (this does not at all mean to the past), we are attempting to think being, [already] thought by Hegel, in the same manner, i.e., historically.

Thinking can stay with its matter only if it becomes ever more rigorous [*sachlicher*] in staying with it, only if the same matter becomes for it more sharply contested[, more pressing]. In this way, the matter for thinking requires

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that thinking endure [*aushalten*] the matter in its context [*Sachverhalt*], withstand [*standhalten*] the context through a correspondence, by bringing the matter to its sustainment. If this matter is being, the thinking that stays with its matter must engage itself in the sustainment of being. Accordingly, in a conversation with Hegel and for the sake of that conversation, we are expected [*daran gehalten*] to clarify in advance the sameness of the same matter. According to what has been said, this requires lifting into the light, in the conversation with the history of philosophy, at the same time the difference of the historical along with the difference of the matter for thinking. Such a clarification must, pressed by necessity [*notgedrungen*], turn out to be short and sketchy.

For the purposes of clarifying the difference that prevails between Hegel’s thinking and our own attempt at thinking, we shall attend to three things.

We shall ask:

1. What is the matter for thinking for Hegel, and what is it for us?
2. What is the criterion for the conversation with the history of thought for Hegel, and what is it for us?
3. What is the character of this conversation for Hegel, and what is it for us?

To the first question:

For Hegel, the matter for thinking is: being with respect to beings' thoughtness [*Gedachtheit*] in and as absolute thinking. For us, the matter for thinking is the same, hence being – but being with respect to its differenz from beings. Put more precisely: for Hegel, the matter for thinking is the thought [*der Gedanke*] as the absolute concept. For us, formulated in a preliminary fashion [i.e., thought being-historically within the conversation with the essence of metaphysics], the matter for thinking⁵⁶ is the differenz *as* differenz.

To the second question:

For Hegel, the criterion for the conversation with the history of philosophy is: to enter into the force and sphere of what has been thought by earlier thinkers. It is not by chance that Hegel advances

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his maxim in the train of a conversation with Spinoza and prior to a conversation with Kant (*Science of Logic, Book III*, Lasson edition, vol. II, p. 216 ff.) In Spinoza, Hegel finds the completed “standpoint of substance,” which cannot, however, be the highest standpoint, because being is not yet just as decisively thought from the ground up as thinking that thinks itself. Being, as substance and substantiality, has not yet unfolded itself into the subject in its absolute subjectivity. Still, Spinoza claims ever anew the whole thinking of German Idealism, and at the same time displaces it into contradiction, because he lets thinking begin with the absolute. Kant's path, in contrast, is other and is even more decisive than Spinoza's system for the thinking of absolute idealism and for philosophy generally. Hegel sees in Kant's thought of the originary synthesis of [transcendental] apperception “one of the most profound principles for speculative development” (*Ibid.*). For Hegel, the temporary force of thinkers lies in what they have thought, insofar as that can⁵⁷ be [referred] to absolute thinking [and therein] sublated [*aufgehoben*] as one of its temporary stages. Absolute thinking is absolute only by moving within its dialectical-speculative process, and therefore requiring⁵⁸ stages.

For us, the criterion for the conversation with historical tradition is the same, insofar as it is a question of entering into the force of earlier thinking. We, however, do not seek that force in what has already been thought, but in something unthought, from which what has been thought receives its essential space. But only what has already been thought prepares what is still unthought, which enters ever anew into its abundance. The criterion of the unthought does not lead to the inclusion of the previously thought into a higher and higher development and systematization⁵⁹ that surpass it.

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Rather, the criterion demands that traditional thinking be set free into its still-preserved having-been [*Gewesenes*].⁶⁰ The latter prevails inceptively throughout the tradition, essences steadily out ahead of it, yet without being thought expressly and as the in-ception [(*in-ception*: event)].

To the third question:

For Hegel, the conversation with the previous history of philosophy has the character of *Aufhebung*, i.e., of the comprehending that mediates in the sense of the absolute foundation.

For us, the character of the conversation with the history of thinking is no longer *Aufhebung*, but the step back.⁶¹

Aufhebung leads into the escalating, gathering region of the truth posited as absolute, truth in the sense of the completely unfolded certainty of self-knowing knowledge [“the idea”].

⁵⁶ i.e., what is question-worthy – p. 6 “essential lineage”

⁵⁷ might?

⁵⁸ the “will” of “spirit”

⁵⁹ no *dialectic*

⁶⁰ what already essences – as safekeeping that grants [*Gewährnis*] – (*Aletheia*) ≠ truth (of the in-ception)

⁶¹ “Letter on Humanism” {GA 9}

The step back points into the realm which until now has been leaped over,⁶² from which the essence [“essence”] of truth⁶³ becomes worthy of thought above all.

After this brief characterization of the difference between Hegel’s thinking and ours with respect to the matter and with respect to the criterion and character of a conversation with the history of thinking, let us now try to proceed with the conversation begun with Hegel and clarify it a little more. This means: we risk an attempt with the step back. The term “step back” suggests various misinterpretations.

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“Step back” means not an isolated step of thought but the manner of thinking’s way-making movement |(that articulately resigns)| and a lengthy way |the way back into the in-ception|. Insofar as the step back determines the character of our conversation with the history of Western thinking, it leads thinking in a certain manner away from what has been thought hitherto in philosophy. Thinking steps back in the face of its matter, being, |i.e., the differenz in its concealing,| and thus brings what is thought into an encounter [*Gegenüber*] in which we glimpse the whole of this history – glimpse it with respect to what constitutes the source |clearing| of this whole thinking. This constitutes thinking in that it prepares at all for thinking the region of its sojourn.⁶⁴ In distinction from Hegel |absolute thinking|, this is not a problem that comes down to us already posed, but what has everywhere remained unasked throughout this history of thinking. We name it, provisionally and unavoidably, in the |representing-positing| language of the tradition. We speak of the *differenz* |, namely, that| between being and beings. The step back goes from what is unthought, from the differenz as such, into what is to be thought.⁶⁵ |better: from the differenz *into* what is to be thought: the differenz *as such*. Oblivion belongs to it as such. Differenz remains withdrawn, held back. Concealing is concealing of the clearing as such, i.e., of the event. |What is to be thought is the *oblivion* of the differenz. The oblivion to be thought here is the veiling of the difference as such, thought from *lēthē* (concealing); this veiling has in turn withdrawn itself inceptively.⁶⁶ Oblivion belongs to

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the differenz because the differenz belongs to oblivion. |to what extent?| Oblivion does not befall the differenz only afterward [*nachträglich*], in consequence of a forgetfulness of human thinking. |The talk of oblivion is no defamation of philosophy – |

The differenz between beings and being is the area within which |, as something unthought,| metaphysics, Western thinking in its entire nature, can be what it is. The step back thus moves out of metaphysics into the essence of metaphysics. The remark about Hegel’s use of the ambiguous guide-word “being” lets us recognize that talk of being and beings does not admit of being pinned down to *one* epoch in the history of the clearing of “being” |i.e., dispensation of being|. Nor does talk of “being” ever understand this name in the sense of a genus, an empty generality under which the historiographically represented doctrines of beings are subsumed as individual cases. “Being” ever and each time speaks dispensationally, and thus as thoroughly governed by tradition.

But the step back out of metaphysics into its essence demands a duration and an endurance [*Dauer und Ausdauer*] whose dimensions/measures we do not know. Only one thing is clear: the step back requires a preparation which must be risked here and now; but it must be risked in the face of beings as such and as a whole, as they *are* now and are visibly starting to show themselves more unequivocally. What now *is*, is

⁶² forgotten – remaining-away in withdrawal
not yet experienced |this option is better|
concealing itself

⁶³ in the sense of the clearing’s safekeeping that grants [*Gewährnis*]

Cf. the *conclusion* of the lecture “Hegel and the Greeks” (1958, Heidelberg Academy of Sciences {GA 9}) [on] “truth” (cf. “Zur Sache des Denkens,” p. 77 note) – custody [is] granting [*Wahrnis Gewährnis*] of the clearing of self-concealing.

⁶⁴ event

Cf. below, the “whither,” p. 61

⁶⁵ *Step back* in the face of the whole dispensation of being is in itself the awakening out of the event into the event *as* – expropriation [*Enteignis*] from out of the juncture.

⁶⁶ Cf. “What is Called Thinking?” [on] withdrawal {in GA 7:134 and 139} [not the lecture course in GA 8]

engraved with the dominance of the essence of modern technicity [*Technik*]. This dominance is already presenting itself, in all regions of life, by manifold identifiable traits, such as functionalization, systematic improvement, automation, bureaucratization, communications [*Information*], |cybernetics|. Just as we name the representing of living things ‘biology,’ just so the presentation and full articulation of beings that are dominated by the essence of technicity can be called ‘technology.’⁶⁷ The expression may

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serve as a designation for the metaphysics of the atomic age. Seen from the present and taken over from the insight into it,⁶⁸ the step back out of metaphysics into the essence of metaphysics is the step out of technology and the technological description and interpretation of the times, into the *essence*⁶⁹ of modern technicity, which is still to be thought.

This indication ought to hold off the other obvious misinterpretation of the term “step back”: the view that the step back consists in a historical return to the earliest thinkers of Western philosophy. The “whither,” of course, to which the step back directs us, unfolds and shows itself only in the enactment of the step |(the way back into the in-ception)|.

So as to win through the seminar a glance into the whole of Hegelian metaphysics, we chose as a temporary expedient a discussion of the section with which the first book of the *Science of Logic*, “The Doctrine of Being,” opens. The section title already gives us, in every word, plenty to think. It reads: “*With what must the beginning of science be made?*” Hegel’s answer to this question consists in the demonstration that the beginning is “of a speculative nature.” This says: the beginning is neither something immediate nor something mediated. We tried to express this nature of the beginning in a speculative sentence: “The beginning is the result.” In accordance with the dialectical plurality of meanings of the “is,” this says several things. This is one: the beginning is – taking *resultare* in its literal meaning⁷⁰ – the rebound of the thinking that thinks itself out of the completion of the dialectical movement. |whither? into externalization toward the simple abstraction “being”| The completion of this movement, the absolute idea, is the closed whole unfolded within itself, the fullness of being. The rebound from this fullness yields the emptiness of being |i.e., the indeterminate immediacy – determination as *mediation* is begun from it|. In science

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(the absolute, self-knowing knowledge), the beginning must be made with this emptiness. The beginning and the end of the movement, and before them the movement itself, everywhere remains being. |“being”: the idea – the absolute mediation of the thinking of thinking.| It essences as the movement, circling within itself, from fullness into the outermost externalization and again from there into self-completing fullness. Thus, the matter for thinking is for Hegel the thinking that thinks itself as being that circles within itself. |“being”: – reality – the *actualitas* of activity – the pure (leaving behind no remainder), completed mediation.| In an inversion which is not only legitimate but necessary, the speculative proposition concerning the beginning runs: “The result is |“is”| the beginning.” The beginning must authentically be made with the result, insofar as the beginning results from that result. |the result / the mediation that is completed, i.e., not ceasing but demanded in its full movedness.|

This says the same as the remark which Hegel adds in an aside and in parentheses, near the end of the section about the beginning: “(and *God* would have the perfectly undisputed right that the beginning be made with him)” (Lasson edition, vol. I, 63 [SL 55]). According to the question that is the title of the section, we are now dealing with the “beginning of science.” If science must begin with God, then it is the science of God: theology. This name is taken here in its later meaning of theo-logy as representation’s assertions about God. *Theologos*, *theologia* initially means the mythopoetic saying of the gods, without reference to any creed or ecclesial doctrine.

⁶⁷ the human / the industrial economy / *sociology*

⁶⁸ “Insight Into That Which Is,” 1949 {GA 79}

⁶⁹ *its own* [das Eigene]

⁷⁰ [To leap back, to rebound]

Why is “science” – which since Fichte is the name for metaphysics – why is science theology? Answer: because science is the systematic⁷¹ development

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of knowing, the being of beings knows itself as this knowing, and thus is |“is”|⁷² it in truth. Emerging during the transition from the medieval to the modern period, the schoolmen’s title for the science of being, i.e., for the science of beings as such in general, is ‘ontosophy’ or ‘ontology.’ Western metaphysics, however, since its start with the Greeks, has been both ontology and theology, yet without being tied to these rubrics. For this reason, my inaugural lecture *What is Metaphysics?* (1929) defines⁷³ metaphysics as the question about beings as such *and* as a whole |*on – hen / arkhē*|. The wholeness |the totality| of this whole is the unity |*hen panta*| of beings that unifies as the ground that brings forth. To those who can read, this means: metaphysics is onto-theo-logy. Someone who has experienced theology in his own roots, both the theology of the Christian faith and that of philosophy, would today rather remain silent about God in the realm of thinking. [Namely, Heidegger] For the onto-theological character of metaphysics has become questionable for thinking, not because of any kind of atheism, but from the experience of a thinking which has discerned in onto-theo-logy the still *unthought* unity of the essence of metaphysics. This essence of metaphysics, however, still remains what is most worthy of thought for thinking, as long as thinking does not arbitrarily – and therefore undispensed – break off the conversation with its dispensational tradition.

In the fifth (1949) edition of “What is Metaphysics?,” a new introduction explicitly refers to the

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onto-theological essence⁷⁴ of metaphysics. But it would be rash to maintain that metaphysics is theology because it is ontology. One will rather say: metaphysics is theology, an assertion about God, because God comes into philosophy. Thus the question concerning the onto-theological character of metaphysics is sharpened to the question: how does the god |and according to which sense of godhood (*theion*)?| come into philosophy – not just modern philosophy, but philosophy as such? This question can be answered only after it has first been sufficiently unfolded as a question.

We can properly think through the question *How does the god come into philosophy?* only when that *to which* the god is supposed to come has become sufficiently clear: philosophy itself. As long as we search through the history of philosophy merely historiographically, we shall find everywhere that God has [already] come into it. But granted that philosophy, as thinking, is the free and spontaneously enacted self-engagement with beings as such, then the god can come into philosophy only insofar as philosophy, of itself and according to its essence, demands that and determines how the god comes into it. The question *How does the god enter into philosophy?* leads back to the question, *What is the origin of the onto-theological essential constitution of metaphysics?* But to take over the question posed thus means to enact the step back.

In this step, we turn our thought to the essential lineage of the onto-theological structure of all metaphysics. We ask: how does the god come into metaphysics and, corresponding to god, theology, and with theology the onto-theological basic trait? We raise this question in a conversation with the whole of the history of philosophy. But we are questioning at the same time from out of a specific look at Hegel. This prompts us first to give thought to something rare/strange.

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Hegel thinks being in its emptiest emptiness, that is, in its utmost generality. At the same time, he thinks being in its fully completed fullness. Still, he does not call speculative philosophy, i.e., philosophy proper,

⁷¹ meaning? Cf. Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, “The Architectonic of Pure Reason” {B 860}: “But I understand by a system the unity of manifold cognitions under one idea. This idea is the concept of reason in the form of a whole, insofar as through it the grasping of the manifold is determined *a priori*, as are the places of the parts among one another.”

⁷² the “is” of the speculative proposition and “reality.”

⁷³ But the *katholou* [universal] means in Aristotle at once the *koinotaton* and the *timiōtaton on* [most common, most honorable entity]. *Kath holou* [according to the whole] and *hen* [one] a designated *kataphasis – legein ti kata tinōs* [saying something about something]

What permits of being said *kath holou* – when beings *ta onta – einai* [to be] –

⁷⁴ Cf. *Holzwege* {GA 5:195}.

onto-theo-logy, but rather “Science of Logic.” By giving it this name, Hegel brings to light something decisive. It would be easy, of course, to explain the designation of metaphysics as “logic” by pointing out that for Hegel the matter for thinking is “the thought,” understanding that word as a *singulare tantum*. The thought, thinking, is obviously and by ancient custom the theme of logic. Certainly. But it is just as incontestable that Hegel, faithful to tradition, finds the matter for thinking in beings as such and as a whole, in the movement of being from its emptiness to its developed fullness.

But how can “being” decay/fall in the first place, so as to present itself as “thought”? How else than by the fact that being is engraved beforehand as [the] ground,⁷⁵ while thinking – since it belongs together with being – gathers itself toward being as its ground, in the manner of fathoming the ground and accounting for the ground.⁷⁶ Being manifests itself as the thought [*der Gedanke*]. This means: the being of beings reveals itself as the ground that gives itself ground and accounts for itself. [Both] the ground and the *ratio*, according to their essential lineage, are the *Logos*, in the sense of the letting-lie-before that gathers: the *hen panta* [all is one]. Thus, “science,” that is, metaphysics, is in truth “logic” for Hegel, not because the theme of science is thinking, but because *being* remains the matter for thinking; while being, ever since the dawn of its unconcealing in the character of *Logos*, of the ground that grounds, lays claim to thinking as accounting for the ground.

Metaphysics thinks beings as such, i.e., in general [*koinotaton* better: what is most common]. Metaphysics thinks beings as such, i.e., as
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a whole [in their wholeness, but does not think the wholeness as such from its provenance, which can no longer be defined as “being”]. Metaphysics thinks the being of beings both in the ground-giving/comprehensive unity of what is most general, i.e., what is equivalently valid [*Gleich-Gültigen*] everywhere, and also in the unity – one that accounts for the ground – of the totality, i.e., of what is highest above everything. The being of beings is thus thought in advance as the grounding ground. Therefore, all metaphysics is at bottom, from the ground up, what grounds, which gives the account/reckoning [*Rechenschaft*] of the ground [*reor, ratio; ratio* in the Middle Ages = *Rede*], is called to account [*Rede*] by the ground, and finally calls the ground to account [*Rede*]/makes it accountable.

Why do we mention this? So that we may experience the shopworn titles ‘ontology,’ ‘theology,’ ‘onto-theology’ in their authentic gravity. At first and commonly, the titles ‘ontology’ and ‘theology’ are, of course, selected like other familiar ones: psychology, biology, cosmology, archeology. The final syllable, -*logy*, means broadly and usually that we are dealing with *the science* of the soul, of living things, of the cosmos, of ancient things. But -*logy* hides more than just the logical in the sense of what is consistent and, generally, what befits assertion [*Aussagemäßige*], which structures, moves, secures, and communicates all scientific knowledge. In each case, the -*Logia* is the totality of a nexus of ground-accounting, within which nexus the objects of the sciences are represented with respect to their ground, i.e., are conceptualized. But ontology and theology are “-ologies” inasmuch as they fathom the ground of/comprehend beings as such and account for them as a whole. They give an account/reckoning [*Rechenschaft*] of being as the ground of beings. They are called to account by the *Logos*, and are in an essential sense governed by the *Logos*, i.e., the logic of the *Logos*. Accordingly, they are more precisely called onto-logic and theo-logic. More rigorously [*sachgemäßer*] and clearly thought out, metaphysics is: onto-theo-logic.

We now understand the name “logic” in the essential
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⁷⁵ Cf. *Der Satz vom Grund* {GA 10}.

⁷⁶ [There are three closely related terms in the German text: “*begründen*” (to account for), “*ergründen*” (to give [or fathom] the ground), and “*gründen*” (to ground). In a consultation, Heidegger clarified the relation of these terms as follows: “*Begründen*” has to do with beings and is ontic. “*Ergründen*” belongs to being and is ontological. “*Gründen*” is the relationship of “*begründen*” and “*ergründen*” and encompasses both. (Tr.)] [This note from Stambaugh should be compared with GA 45, §§20-28, where *begründen* (there translated ‘founding’) establishes correctness, *gründen* sets this back into unconcealment of what-is, while *ergründen* interrogates unconcealment as such (i.e., the truth of being).]

sense, which also includes the title used by Hegel and thus for the first time elucidates it: namely, as the name for that kind of thinking which everywhere fathoms and accounts for the ground of beings as such within the whole in terms of being as the ground (*Logos*).⁷⁷ The fundamental trait of metaphysics is onto-theo-logic. We should now be in a position to explain how the god comes into philosophy.

To what extent is an explanation successful? To the extent that we attend to the following: the matter for thinking is beings as such, i.e., being [as being of beings]. Being shows itself in the ground's kind of essence [*Wesensart*]. Accordingly, the matter for thinking, being as the ground, is thought fundamentally only when the ground is represented as the primary ground, *prōtē arkhē*. The originary matter for thinking presents itself as the primal cause [*Ur-Sache*], the *causa prima* that corresponds to the account-giving regress toward the *ultima ratio*, the final reckoning. The being of beings is fundamentally represented in the sense of the ground only as *causa sui*. This is the metaphysical concept of God. Metaphysics must think in the direction of God because the matter for thinking is being, but this as ground in manifold ways: as *Logos*, as *hupokeimenon* [underlying thing], as substance, as subject.

This explanation presumably defends something correct, but it remains thoroughly inadequate for discussing/situating the essence of metaphysics. For metaphysics is not only theo-logic but also onto-logic. Metaphysics, first of all, is neither only the one nor *also* the other. Rather, metaphysics is theo-logic because it is onto-logic. It is onto-logic because it is theo-logic. The onto-theological essential constitution of metaphysics cannot be explained in terms of either theologic or ontologic, even if an explanation could ever do justice here to what remains to be considered.

Namely, the following still remain unthought: from what unity ontologic and theologic belong together, the provenance of this

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unity, and the distinction of the distinguished ones which this unity unifies. The problem here is obviously not a union of two independent disciplines of metaphysics, but the unity of *what* is in question, and in thought, in ontologic and theologic: beings as such qua universal and first *at one with* beings as such qua highest and last. The unity of this unifying is of such a kind that what is last in its own way accounts for the ground of what is first, and what is first in its way for what is last. The difference between the two ways of ground-accounting itself falls into the still-unthought distinction we mentioned.

The essential constitution of metaphysics consists in the unity of beings as such qua universal and [of beings] qua the highest. [cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics E.1*]

Our task here is to situate the question about the onto-theo-logical nature of metaphysics first of all simply as a question. Only the matter itself can direct us into the place situated by the question about metaphysics' onto-theological constitution and can do so such that we attempt to think the matter for thinking more rigorously [*sachlicher*]. The matter for thinking has been handed down to Western thinking under the name "being." If we think about this matter just a bit more rigorously [*sachlicher*], if we attend more carefully to what is contested in the matter, then [the following] shows itself: *being* means always and everywhere: the being *of beings*.⁷⁸ The genitive in this phrase is to be thought as an objective genitive. *Beings* means always and everywhere: the beings *of being*; here the genitive is to be thought as a subjective genitive. It is, however, with certain reservations that we speak of a genitive with respect to object and subject, because these terms, subject and object, in their turn stem from a particular engraving of being. Only this much is clear, that when we deal with the being of beings and with the beings of being, we deal in each case with a *differenz*.

Thus, we think being rigorously [*sachlich*] only when we think it in its *differenz* from beings, and beings in their *differenz* from being. The *differenz* thus comes expressly into view.

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If we try to represent it, we will at once find ourselves misled into grasping the *differenz* as a formal relation [*eine Relation*] which our representing has added to being and to beings. Thereby, the *differenz* is reduced to a verbal distinction [*einer Distinktion*], to something set apart by our intellect [*Verstand*].

⁷⁷ Cf. *Der Satz vom Grund* {GA 10}.

⁷⁸ Cf. *Holzwege* {GA 5:176f}.

Yet if we assume that the differenz is a contribution from our representing, the question arises: a contribution toward/to what? One replies: to beings. Good. But what does that mean: “beings” [and how the toward/to]? What else could it mean than: such things as *are*? [intransitive “are”] Thus, we destroy the supposed contribution, the representation of a differenz from being. But “being” itself says: being, which is *beings*. [transitive “is”] There, whither we were supposed to first bring along differenz as an alleged contribution, we always already encounter being and beings in their differenz. It is as in Grimm’s fairy tale *The Hedgehog and the Hare*: “I’m already here.” Now, one could deal with [*verfahren*] this strange state of affairs – that being and beings are in each case already found from out of the differenz and within it⁷⁹ – in a crude manner and explain it as follows: our representational thinking just happens to be so structured and constituted that it everywhere, over its own head and out of its own head, as it were, adds the differenz between beings and being ahead of time. [the a priori; Kant] Much might be said, and much more might be asked, about this explanation that is seemingly illuminating but is also too quick. Above all: where does the “between” come from, into which the differenz [what differs] is, so to speak, supposed to be inserted? [cf. *What is a Thing?*]

We shall discard all views and explanations, and attend instead
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to the following: what is named ‘differenz’ we find everywhere and always in the matter for thinking, in beings as such; we find it so indubitably that we do not at all first become aware of it as such [explicitly]. Nor does anything compel us to notice it. Our thinking is free either to let the differenz [as such] go unthought or to consider it explicitly as such [i.e., as what?]. But this freedom does not hold in every case. Unexpectedly, it may happen that thinking finds itself called upon to ask: what does it say, this being that is named so often? If being [nevertheless] shows itself hereby immediately as the being of ... , thus in the genitive of the differenz, then the preceding question more rigorously [*sachlicher*] runs: what do you make of the differenz if being as well as beings appear,⁸⁰ each in its own way, *by virtue/from out of the differenz*? [differenz lets appear – makes available] To do justice to this question, we must first bring ourselves to the differenz in a rigorous [*sachgemäßes*] encounter [*Gegenüber*].⁸¹ This encounter [*Gegenüber*] opens itself to us if we enact the step back. For as this step gains for us the de-distancing [*Ent-Fernung*], what is near gives itself as such for the first time; nearness comes to its first shining. By the step back, we let the matter for thinking, being [(being of beings)] as differenz, go free into an encounter, one which can remain thoroughly objectless. [how so? In a letting-say-for-itself – ; no representing or accounting for the ground.]

Still looking at the differenz, though by the step back already releasing it into what is to be thought, we can say: the being of beings means: being which is beings.

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The “is” here speaks transitively, in transition.⁸² Being here essences in the manner of a transition to beings. Nonetheless, being does not abandon its place and go over to beings, as though beings could [*be* beings] beforehand without being, could be approached by being for the first time. Being crosses over (that), in revealing comes over (that) which first arrives as something unconcealed from itself only by such [in such] coming-over [or overwhelming: *Überkommnis*]. Arrival means: to shelter itself in unconcealment:

⁷⁹ *Sustainment* [Austrag]

Aus – *Einander* – tragen [to sustain each other, or to bear out toward one another] / “by clearing” — but *precisely* this

⁸⁰ They do not appear, but are covered over by “differenz” in its “unity” from out of the event and their belonging-together – how experienced? needed re-signing in the event

Thereto, the essence of ground

Essence of “truth” – i.e., “unconcealing” (still on the basis of Dasein!)

⁸¹ *over against us/face to face with us* – no stand against/no object [*kein Gegen stand*] we? belonging to the “against”

⁸² “transitive” not in the ontic-ontological sense

Being as *transcendens* simply! This reference only wants to say: being – “is” not a being – (being “is” in no way).

What is transitive: letting; making available

therefore, to presence enduringly [*anwähren*] as sheltered: to be an entity |be *what-is*|. [Here we have overshadowing and advent; cf. *On Inception*.]

Being shows itself as the overwhelming that unconceals |as the clearness [*Lichtnis*]; i.e., as the overwhelming that clears|. Beings as such appear in the manner of the arrival that shelters itself in unconcealment.

Being, in the sense of the overwhelming that reveals, and beings as such, in the sense of arrival that shelters itself, essence as what is thus distinguished [*Unterschiedenen*] from out of the same, the divergence [*Unter-Schied*]. |here the fall back| The divergence alone first grants and holds apart the between, in which the overwhelming and the arrival⁸³ are held toward one another, are borne away from and toward each other. The differenz of being and beings, as the divergence of |i.e., as cleared between for| overwhelming and arrival, is the *sustainment* of the two *that unconceals and shelters*. In the sustainment there prevails⁸⁴ a clearing of what veils itself and closes itself off; this prevailing bestows the apart- and toward-one-another of overwhelming and arrival.

By attempting to consider the differenz as such |in the oblivion of the sustainment as clearing|,
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we do not make it disappear |giving up|; rather, we follow it |– whither?| into its essential provenance. Underway toward this, we think the sustainment of overwhelming and arrival. This is the matter for thinking, thought with more rigor [*sachlicher*] after a step back: being, thought from out of the differenz.

Here there is required, of course, a remark in the interstices, one concerning our talk |talk of “being”| about the matter for thinking – a remark that ever anew demands our attention. When we say “being,” we use the word in its widest and most indeterminate generality. But already when we speak merely of a generality, we have thought being in an unsuitable way. We represent being in a way in which it, being, never gives itself. The manner in which the matter [*Sache*] for thinking – being – relates [*verhält*] itself remains a unique state of affairs [*Sachverhalt*]. |*the uniqueness* of being!| Initially, our customary ways of thinking can only ever clarify it inadequately. This we shall try to show by an example, bearing in mind from the start that nowhere in beings is there an example [*ein Beispiel*] for the |verbal| essence of being, presumably because the essence of being is itself the game [*das Spiel*].

Hegel at one point⁸⁵ mentions the following case to characterize the generality of the universal: someone wants to buy fruit in a store. He asks for fruit. He is offered apples and pears; he is offered peaches, cherries, grapes. But the shopper rejects all that is offered. He wants, at any price, to have fruit. Now, what was offered to him in every instance *is* fruit, and yet, it turns out, fruit cannot be bought.

It remains infinitely more impossible to represent “being” as the general characteristic of particular beings. It |event – as the it – which “gives” by owning| gives being⁸⁶ only ever
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in this or that dispensational engraving: *Phusis, Logos, Hen, Idea, Energeia*, Substantiality, Objectivity, Subjectivity |absolute idea|, the Will, the Will to Power, the Will to Will. But it does not give these dispensational [structures] aligned in rows, like apples, pears, peaches, lined up on the counter of historical representation. [being is finite, historical]

And yet, did we not hear of being in the historical order and sequence of the dialectical process that Hegel thinks? Sure. But even here, being gives itself only in the light that has cleared itself for Hegel’s thinking. |light and clearing| That is to say: the manner in which it, being, gives itself [to a particular thinking], is itself determined in each case from the way in which it clears itself |makes itself available / *A-letheia*|. This way, however, is a dispensational, an always epochal engraving, which essences for us as

⁸³ Arrival: *having-arrived/arrivedness* [*Angekommenheit*].

To presence enduringly [*Anwähren*] into *having-arrived*.

⁸⁴ The reigning/prevaling of world: event of the four-fold

The reigning/prevaling of the sustainment: event –

⁸⁵ *Encyclopedia*, §13.

⁸⁶ Letting-presence – as allowing presencing

Allowing: dispensing: giving: owning

such only when we let it go free into its own having-been. We attain to the nearness of what is dispensational only through the momentary⁸⁷ suddenness of recollection. The same also holds for the experience of the temporary engraving of the differenz of being and beings, to which corresponds a temporary interpretation of beings as such |metaphysics|. What has been said holds above all also for our attempt, in the step back out of the oblivion of the differenz as such, to recollect this differenz as the sustainment of overcoming that unconceals and arrival that shelters itself. Indeed, it is announced to a more precise listening that in this saying of sustainment we already let what-has-been come to word, insofar as we recollect unconcealing and sheltering |*A-letheia*], transition/crossing-over⁸⁸ (transcendence) and arrival (presencing). In fact, it may be that even through this situating of the differenz of being and beings into sustainment as the suburb of their essence,

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something pervasive comes to shine forth [*zum Vorschein*] which pervades the dispensation of being from its beginning to its completion. [Looking for unity in being's essencing] Yet it remains difficult to say how this pervasiveness is to be thought, if it is neither something universal, valid in all cases, nor a law guaranteeing/securing the necessity of a process in the sense of the dialectical. [Here the puzzle: what unifies the manifold meanings/engravings of being?]

That alone on which our fore-having now depends is the insight into a possibility of thinking the differenz as sustainment such that it becomes clearer to what extent the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics has its essential provenance in the sustainment that starts the history of metaphysics, governs throughout its epochs, and yet remains everywhere concealed *as* the sustainment, and thus remains forgotten in an oblivion that still withdraws itself |oblivion of being|. [beyng = sustainment here]

In order to facilitate that insight, let us consider being, and in it the differenz |initially only as / being, *not* beings|, and in that the sustainment |the belonging-together of both|, on the basis of the engraving of being by which being has cleared itself as *Logos*, as the ground.⁸⁹ [= a regress from a particular dispensation] In the overwhelming that unconceals, being shows itself as the letting-lie-before of what arrives,⁹⁰ as the grounding in the manifold ways of bringing forth and bringing before us |[i.e.] of originarily thought forming/imaging|. Beings as such, the arrival that shelters itself into unconcealment, are what is grounded, which as

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grounded and thus effected |whence “effecting”?| in turn grounds in its own way, namely, it effects, i.e., causes. The sustainment of what grounds and what is grounded as such not only holds the two apart from one another, it holds them toward one another. The ones carried apart from one another are held in the tension [*verspannt*] of the sustainment such that not only does being ground beings as |the| ground, but beings for their part ground being, cause it, in their way. Beings are capable of such only insofar as they “are” the fullness of being: as what is most in being [*das Seiendste*].

Here our meditation attains an exciting connection. Being essences as *Logos* in the sense of ground, of letting-lie-before. The same *Logos*, as the gathering of what unifies, is the *Hen*. This *Hen*, however, is twofold: the unifying One in the sense of what is everywhere first and thus most universal |*koinotaton*|; and at the same time, the unifying One in the sense of what is highest (Zeus) |*timiōtaton*|. In grounding, the *Logos* gathers everything into the universal, and in accounting for the ground, it gathers everything from out of the unique. It may be noted in passing that the same *Logos*, moreover |better: above all|, shelters in

⁸⁷ *Sein und Zeit*, 385 {GA 2: 509}.

⁸⁸ Yet the *coming-over* is not the inversely directed “transcendence”

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for that there is no metaphysical title available, because already thought from the event

⁸⁹ Cp. French: “fonds” = ground; lands – estate [*Vermögen*]

fond: cf. Descartes, *Discourse on Method* [Part II], *batir dans un fonds* [to base *in* a ground] – [this means:] *batir sur des fondements* [to base *on* the foundations]

⁹⁰ and conversely: the letting-lie-before shows itself – seen *purely* from beings – as overwhelming over these

⁹¹ Forming/imaging [*Bilden*]: pestle [*pilon* is French] – to strike forth [*her-vor-stoßen*] – to fetch/to bring [*holen*]

itself the essential lineage of the engraving of language's essence [assertion – proposition / *keisthai*, *thesis*] and thus determines the manner of saying as something logical in a very broad sense.

Inasmuch as being essences as the being of beings, as the differenz, as the sustainment, the apart-from-and toward-one-another of grounding and accounting for the ground endures, being grounds beings, and beings, as what most are, account for the ground of being. One overwhelms the other, one arrives in the other. Overwhelming and arrival appear reciprocally in each other in the reflection. Spoken from out of the differenz, this means: the sustainment is a circling, the circling round one another of being and beings. Grounding itself appears within the clearing of the sustainment as something that *is*, which thus itself, as a being, demands the corresponding accounting for the ground through a being,

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i.e., causation, and indeed causation by the highest cause. [an echo of the fourfold's mirror-play]

One of the classic instances of this state of affairs [*Sachverhalt*] in the history of metaphysics is found in a generally neglected text from Leibniz, which we call for short “The 24 Theses of Metaphysics” (Gerhardt, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, VII, 289 ff.; cf. M. Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund* [*The Principle of Reason*, GA 10], 1957, 51 ff.).⁹²

Metaphysics corresponds to being as *Logos* and is accordingly everywhere, in its principal trait, logic, but a logic that thinks the being of beings – accordingly, the logic determined from what differs in the differenz: onto-theo-logic. [not logic as meditation on the *logos* as saying – language]

Insofar as metaphysics thinks beings as such as a whole, it represents beings with respect to what differs in the differenz, without attending to the differenz *as* differenz.

What differs shows itself as the being of beings qua universal and as the being of beings qua highest.

Because being appears as ground, beings are what is grounded; the highest being, however, is what accounts for the ground in the sense of the first cause. When metaphysics thinks beings with respect to the ground that is common to every being as such, then it is logic as onto-logic. When metaphysics thinks beings as such as a whole, i.e., with respect to the highest being, which accounts for the ground of everything, then it is logic as theo-logic.

Because the thinking of metaphysics stays engaged in the differenz which is unthought as such, metaphysics is both ontology and theology in a unified way, from out of the unifying unity of the sustainment.

The onto-theological constitution of metaphysics stems from the prevailing of that differenz which holds apart from and toward one another being as ground and beings as [1] what is grounded and [2] what gives account for the ground; this holding out/enduring [*Aushalten*] accomplishes the sustainment [*Austrag*]. [*Aus-trag* [carrying outward]: shining-forth [*Vorschein*] (that conceals) of the event| [the hope hidden in metaphysics; cf. “The Turn”]

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What is so named refers our thinking to the realm which the guide-words of metaphysics – being and beings, the ground and what is grounded – no longer suffice to say. For what these words name, what the manner of thinking that is guided by them represents, stems, as what differs, from the differenz. Their provenance no longer allows itself to be thought within the scope of metaphysics.⁹³

The insight into the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics shows a possible way to answer, from the essence of metaphysics, the question, *How does the god come into philosophy?* [How? That means: 1. In what manner? 2. In what shape?]

The god comes into philosophy through the sustainment, which we think initially as the suburb of the essence of the differenz between being and beings. The differenz constitutes the ground-plan in the construction of the essence of metaphysics. The sustainment yields and gives away being as the ground that

⁹² Now cf. *Nietzsche* II {GA 6.2, 414ff}.

⁹³ No longer: to ask concerning its provenance – this on the *Holzweg*; rather: to let differenz and transcendence go to engage oneself in the “identity” of being and beings but that means: to convert [or to twist free: *verwinden*] identity into the event as the sanction [*Befugnis*] of the four-fold / the thing

brings forth, which ground itself requires the accounting that befits [*gemäßen*] it from what is accounted for by it, i.e., requires causation by the most originary thing. This is the cause as *causa sui*. That is the legitimate name for god in philosophy. Humans can neither pray nor can they sacrifice to this god. Humans can neither fall to their knees in awe before the *causa sui*, nor play music and dance before this god.

Accordingly, the god-less thinking which must give up [in the step back from metaphysics into its essence; inadequate!] the god of philosophy, god as *causa sui*, is perhaps closer to the divine god. Here this means only: god-less thinking is freer for [i.e., broader and more prepared for] the god than onto-theo-logic would like to admit.

This remark may throw a little light on the path [*path?* → sojourn];
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what is underway to this path is a thinking that enacts the step back, back out of metaphysics into the essence⁹⁴ of metaphysics, back out of the oblivion of the differenz as such into the dispensation [dispensation as *one* suddenness of the event] of the self-withdrawing concealing of the sustainment.

No one can know whether and when and where and how this step of thinking unfolds itself into an authentic (used in the event) path and course and road-building. It could be that the dominance of metaphysics entrenches itself, to wit [namely], in the shape [meaning here essence: i.e., in the *positionality*] of modern technicity with its fascinating, rushing developments. It could also be that everything that results by way of the step back becomes merely exploited and absorbed [and thereby disregarded and given over in the most dangerous ways] by the advancing metaphysics in its own way, as the result of a representational thinking.

Thus, the step back would itself remain unenacted, and the path that it opens and points out would remain untraced.

Such considerations impose themselves [*drängen sich auf*] easily, but they have no gravity in relation to a wholly other difficulty through which the step back must pass.

The difficulty lies in language. Our Western languages are, each in different ways, languages of metaphysical thinking. Whether the essence of Western languages is in itself engraved only metaphysically, and thus engraved permanently by onto-theo-logic, or whether these languages grant other possibilities of saying, which means at the same time possibilities of telling non-saying,

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must remain open.⁹⁵ The difficulty to which thoughtful saying remains exposed has appeared often enough in the course of this seminar. The little word “is,” which speaks everywhere in our language and tells of being even where being does not expressly step forth, contains the whole dispensation of being – from the *estin gar einai* of Parmenides, to the “is” of the speculative proposition in Hegel, to the dissolution of the “is” in the positing of the will to power with Nietzsche [and to the formalization of language in logical positivism].

The glance into this difficulty that comes from language should protect us from hastily recasting the language of the thinking attempted here into the coin of a terminology, and from talking tomorrow of sustainment, instead of devoting all our efforts to thinking through what has been said. For what was said, was said in a seminar. A seminar, as the word implies, is a place and an opportunity to scatter a seed here and there, a seed of reflective thinking [*Nachdenkens*] which some time or other may sprout in its own way and bring forth fruit.

⁹⁴ instead of “to essence” (verbal)
to endure (by granting)
say: owning [*Eignen*] | *ownage* [Eignis]
which brings (lets come) something to itself, so that it can appear *as* itself.
Owning [*Eignung*] (transitive)
as *ap-propriating*.

⁹⁵ Cp. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 267f. {GA 12:255ff.}

Cicero, *Topica* 8

argumentum esse ... rationem, quae rei dubiae faciat fidem
[argument is] to procure faith, assent, trust
in a doubtful thing

Supplements to *The Principle of Identity*

[91]

Supplements I

Cover

What's "really" in-sufficient

about the lecture: "The Principle of Identity"

The way-making movement
of the principle as assertion of identity
| to ap-propriating the
| first stirring [*Ent-wachen*]

Already the glance toward "*Identity*" puts everything
askew in a necessary way.

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Sheet 1

Ground and Event

In the abyssal ground – where no more grounding and yet not nothing

| the *ap-propriating*
ap-propriating and four-fold [*Ge-Viert*]
ap-propriating and the "sustainment" of the opposed parties

↓
bringing about

*

Ground – as "what bears" – by underlying – upon which something "stands"

standing on ... Sub| -stanz

| standing – against –

through a *positioning*

| Standing – as borne | standing upon

| Standing as positioned | positioned/placed *before* [*re-presented*]

namely

| never to "presencing"

*Ground-Principles [*Grund-Sätze*]

Positings [*Setzungen*] of the ground

Positions

Being of the ground

[93]

Sheet 2

Cf. the critical annotations to “The Principle of Identity”
 Principle and leap – here unbecoming –
 not leaping – but awakening into the event –
 Hence, instead of “basic principles/leaps [Sätze] of thinking”
 principles [Prinzipien] of thinking
Prinzip: arkhē – beginning and in-ception
 To re-work the whole text accordingly.

*

The in-ception of thinking. The call –

Sheet 3

The situation
 of the lecture
 from principle [Satz] as assertion
 to
 principle [Satz] as leap
unbecoming

[94]

Sheet 4

Identity from the event

cf. The Principle of Identity, p. 48

- Identity: 1) familiar through the “principle of identity”
 “logic”
 2) Fichte – Schelling – Hegel – Onto-logy –
 Onto-theo –
whence determined here? Being as *Hen* [one]!
 I as identity of subject and object
 the absolute and absolute knowing
 3) *to gar auto* – Parmenides
 To belong to-gether – and *hen* one-ness
 3a) the transformed *auto kath auto* –
 |tauto|
 to auto
 topos
 4) event itself – the *topo* | *logy*
 in its saga

[95]

Sheet 5

Fichte

The positing-against: of the not-I
(is) primordial action, not to be derived from the positing.
(far rather the positing isolated from the positing-against?)

The letting-stand-against first grants objectivity
and thus possibility of affection.

“Affection” “in truth” already an activity of the I

Objects are productions of the I.

Where the stance of this knowing from out of self-knowing?

Third book of *The Definition of Man*

“the fundamental character of knowing: to be *illuminating evidence*”

|
“light”

W. Schulz 21

Introduction to the publication of the letters between Fichte and Schelling⁹⁷

[96]

Sheet 6

Neither *leap* (cf. *Identity and Differenz*, p. 41, 45) nor *entrance*, p. 41
“principle [*Satz*]”

because already “admitted” by the event into the event – but how?

To become at-home in the

already (lived-in) homeland

|
not yet properly/expressly lived-in
but?

cf. *Identity and Differenz*, p. 41, 45

Sheet 7

to gar auto...

first announcement of *being's dispensation* [*Seinsgeschicks*]

“being” *dispensed* to “thinking”

likewise the “*differenz*”

also pertains to being's dispensation [*seinsgeschicklich*]
and therefore surrender [*Preisgabe*]
no lineage [*Herkunft*] to be inventively thought

[97]

Sheet 8

“Identity” as event

no “principle [*Satz*]” –

but “saga”?

|saga and *Satz*|

⁹⁷ {Fichte – Schelling. Briefwechsel. / Einleitung von Walter Schulz / Theorie 1 Suhrkamp Verlag 1968. / The citation placed in quotation marks comes from Schulz's introduction.}

no entrance
but *awakening*
(brightening up)
clearing.

Sheet 9

“Identity”
as event
tolerates no principle as the
saying that befits it –
which saying itself belongs to it
(to the event).

[99]

Supplements II

Cover

On the Lecture (1957)
The Principle of Identity

Sheet 1

To “*The Principle of Identity*”

1. Talk of the “*constellation* of being and the human” inadequate, if being and the human are each taken for themselves and then put together (one knows not in which realm).

| better: “the *belonging* together”

2. the *attempt to let positionality be experienced*, p. 44ff., does not distinguish clearly enough between customary representing and the listening that articulately renounces.
too unmediated and too reaching-ahead –

see p. 77, footnote. {marginal note 126 [here 93]}

Metaphysics is only overcome – i.e., entirely left behind to itself, so that it can no longer have a voice [*mitsprechen*] in thinking, when “transcendence and differenz” have twisted free (The Preliminary I 35 {GA 102}) – and, with them, every possible point of attack for onto-theo-logic.

Sheet 2

to the *identity lecture*

This, too, not yet freely said from out of the even, although what is to be said and the mode of experiencing are recognized.

cf. p. 41, 42, 46

[100]

Sheet 3

Identity lecture (cf. lecture series
summer semester 1957 Basic Principles of Thinking)
see *transcript* {GA 79}

Identity: belonging together

↓ belonging together of being and being-human

↓ this as positionality

↓ in that – in the positioning that gathers up – the owning as self-withdrawing

↓ initial appearance [*Vorschein*] for the appropriating expropriation

↓ event and proper domain (the in-finite relational holding-away)

Owning and reaching: usage

Owning and joining of the juncture: the fitting sanction [*Be-Fugnis*]

Language – as saga of the proper domain.

[101]

Sheet 4

To the Identity-Lecture

see appendix to the text {p. 83}

Like all public expositions, it also makes allowances for the usual metaphysical representing. The thinking attempted remains determined in the *transition* from metaphysics into articulate renunciation.

Thus, it does not come to a wager out of suddenness – i.e., to awakening from oblivion as first stirring [*Entwachen*] into the event of the fourfold [*Ge-Viert*].

Though suddenness does not exclude the backward glance into tradition – yet the relation to the latter remains abyssally grounding.

In the identity-lecture, the thinking in *transition* shows itself already through the theme (starting with the “principle of identity”) and, accordingly, in the talk of “entrance” (*out* of metaphysics) into the event.

Departing leap (*from* metaphysics) into the abyssal ground (oscillation of the event).

Although still thinking in transition, the guiding insight is:

– identity not a characteristic of being, but: essence of being [is] a dispensation [*Geschick*] of identity qua event – not merely a reversal of this sort: identity not a determination of being, but being a determinacy of identity. There is here no support for reversals, which presuppose the constancy of what’s reversed – while precisely everything is changed.

[102]

Sheet 5

The Principle of Identity

The *embarrassment* – in the “step back” – ambiguous and to be spoken misleadingly.

The “belonging-to-one-another of the human and being”

said askew: 1. Being not over against

but event, which as realm turns to use [*verwendet*] the human, as the one who dwells, into the fitting sanction.

2. Not just the human ap-propriated as the one used

– but the human as belonging in the fourfold [*Ge-Viert*].

This the authentic embarrassment of metaphysical thinking.

Accordingly, *also* the *starting-point* of “*thinking and being*”

even: being and time? Or yet otherwise!
with time – the questioning look ahead into the event.

Sheet 6

To “The Principle of Identity”

Through and through said from the *transitional* step back, thus ambiguous and *properly misinterpretive* – p. 41! no “leap [Satz]” in the sense of setting oneself apart, – of a departing leap even less – if already “principle [Satz]” – “positing [Setzen]” out of event within event – the *consigning* displacement into awakening.


still more: the assimilative dis-lodging out of oblivion, to lay forth, into the fitting sanction.

Supplements to
The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics

[106]

Sheet 1

Hegel – Heidegger



[107]

Sheet 2

Hegel Heidegger

1. The completion of philosophy
2. History

to 1) a) *How does philosophy complete itself in Hegel’s system?*
not otherwise than in Hegel’s sense – *speculative*
as of the *thought* – of thinking

matter of philosophy being as *thinking*.
Completion into the end.

- b) Completion in the sense of *being's forgottenness*
Nietzsche – age of technology
(positionality) of its two faces.

Completion into the in-ception.

In-ception of thinking as articulate renunciation!

The various senses of "completing": 1. Ruling out
2. In-cepting

to 2) a) history – as happening in the sense of the *pro-cess*
advance of dialectical thinking

b) dispensation – as event – in-ception.